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Third-Party Consent Searches:
An Alternative Analysis
In recent years, the Supreme Court has abandoned exclusive reliance
on property concepts in deciding whether certain police searches
violate the fourth amendment; instead it has increasingly recognized
the privacy rights of individuals.'
As a concept of general applicability, privacy has been defined as the
"ability of the actor to maintain the integrity of his privacy unit."2
One commentator has described control over the privacy unit as "the
legally recognized freedom or power of an individual (group, associa-
tion, class) to determine the extent to which another individual (group,
association, class, or government) may... obtain or reveal information
about him or those for whom he is personally responsible, or . . . in-
trude physically or in more subtle ways into his life space and his
chosen activities.";2
Although privacy concepts have been used in the fourth amendment
area to define when the government can unilaterally intrude upon an
individual's interests, 4 they have not been applied to the question of
when one individual can validate a governmental intrusion upon an-
other individual's interests. That question is presented in its most
difficult form when two people share a possessory interest in property,
and one consents to a police search directed against the other. Most
courts have held that the first person can consent if he has a possessory
interest in the property equal or superior to that of the person whose
actions are the focus of the search.5 A pure property test, however, fails
to reflect the Supreme Court's recognition that an individual's fourth
amendment protections should not be dependent solely upon his prop-
erty interests.
1 See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 892
U.S. 364 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Kitch, Katz v.
United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. Rxv. 133; Note,
From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968 (1968).
2 Douse, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. RxsoRm
154, 166 (1972). See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
3 Beaney, The Right to Privacy and the American Law, 31 LAw & CoTcEmp. PROB. 253,
254 (1966).
4 See, e.g., cases cited note 1 supra.
5 See text and note at note 53 infra. The person whose actions are the focus of the
search will hereinafter be referred to as either the suspect or the defendant.
The University of Chicago Law Review [41:121
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,G the Supreme Court recently reiter-
ated the well-established rule that when a person whose actions are the
focus of a search gives a valid consent to a police search of his prem-
ises, he cannot later claim that the search violated his fourth amend-
ment rights.7 Although consent must be uncoerced to be valid, the Court
held that consent could be considered voluntary without a showing that
the consenting party knew he had the right to refuse the police request.
It rejected the position that a warning similar to that required by the
Court in Miranda v. Arizona" is necessary to legitimize the consent.9
Whatever the merits of this decision with respect to the consent of
the person against whom the search is directed, it presents acute diffi-
culties when consent is obtained from a third party" who shares pos-
sessory and privacy interests with the suspect." Where consent is ob-
tained from the suspect, the consequences of a search are likely to have
been considered. The suspect normally will have knowledge of the
reason for the police request, regardless of his awareness of his right
to refuse. He has a direct interest in the outcome of the search and
might find cooperation with the authorities a beneficial strategy for
a subsequent defense. The state of mind of the consenting third party,
however, is generally quite different from that of the consenting sus-
pect. The third party, who is usually the suspect's spouse or cotenant,
is often ignorant of his coinhabitant's activities. His response to the
6 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
7 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624
(1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
8 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court held that where a defendant is in custody,
or his freedom significantly restricted, his privilege against self-incrimination must be
protected by procedural safeguards. He must be informed that he has a right to remain
silent, that anything he says may be used against him in court, that he has a right to consult
a lawyer, and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be appointed.
9 The Court's holding that a procedural warning is not required was grounded on the
belief that a determination of voluntariness based on the facts of each case is sufficient
to ensure that the suspect's fourth amendment rights are protected. The Court also
indicated its belief that a warning requirement would be so difficult for the courts and
the police to administer as to be unjustifiable.
10 "Third party" will hereinafter be used to refer to a person who shares with the
suspect possession and control over the property to be searched, but who is not himself
a suspect.
11 Where the suspect has no possessory or privacy interests in the premises to be
searched, he has no fourth amendment rights that are violated by a consent by one in
possession and control of the premises. The situation where consent is sought to search
premises in which the suspect has no interest does raise some problems of unknowing or
impelled consents that result in infringement of the consenter's fourth amendment pro-
tections or those of anyone who shares his privacy unit. As a matter of controlling police
behavior, it might be argued that protections should be provided in such situations. This
comment, however, does not consider the situation where the suspect has no interest in
the premises to be searched.
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official request is not likely to be based on the kind of calculation the
suspect would make about permitting an immediate police search.
Instead the consent may be the result of the intimidating effect of the
official request, confusion over whether refusal will be interpreted as
an admission of the coinhabitant's guilt or the consenter's involvement,
desire to remove what the consenter may feel certain is unwarranted
suspicion, or simple indifference.
In Schneckloth the Court stated that an accommodation must be
reached between effective law enforcement and the deeply held belief
that criminal laws must not be used as an "instrument of unfairness."' 2
Although the accommodation reached in Schneckloth may be appro-
priate as to suspect consenters, the increased risk of impelled, unknow-
ing, or indifferent consent present in third-party consents indicates
that a different accommodation is required. Greater protections than
those provided by Schneckloth are necessary where a third party, by
consenting to a search, in effect diminishes another's constitutional
protections. The problem of the ignorant or inadvertent third-party
consent that allows invasion of another's privacy could be mitigated by
a requirement of procedural warnings. The Court's finding that such
warnings are administratively unfeasible in the suspect consent situa-
tion,'13 however, reflects poorly on the desirability of warnings in third-
party consent cases.
This comment examines the general development of fourth amend-
ment theory into a propertied privacy doctrine, and reviews the current
property-oriented third-party consent doctrines. The comment then sug-
gests, as a solution to the problems of third-party consents, a frame-
work for analyzing third-party consents that reflects recent recognition
of personal rights of privacy. Under the proposed model a "consent
search"' 4 is constitutional only where the consenting party has rights
of possession and control of the premises at least equal to those of the
defendant, and an interest in consenting sufficient to countervail, and
thus render unreasonable, the defendant's expectation that the third
party will not consent to an invasion of the defendant's privacy. A re-
view of recent third-party consent cases reveals that the concept of
"countervailing interest" essential to this model may be defined in a
way that permits easy application of the test by the police and the
courts. It is suggested that the model provides an administratively
feasible means of minimizing unknowing and impelled third-party
12 412 U.S. at 225.
13 Id. at 231.
14 The term "consent search" will be used in this comment to refer to searches that
would violate the defendant's fourth amendment protections but for the consent of a person
other than the defendant.
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consents without eliminating many of the benefits to law enforcement
that third-party consents provide.
I. SEARCH AND SEizuRE DOCTRINE: FROM PROPERTY TO
t PROPERTIED PRIVACY
The protections of the fourth amendment 5 are directed against
violations of personal security by the sovereign;1 6 searches conducted
by private individuals, whether lawful or unlawful, are not proscribed
by the amendment.' 7 The amendment does not forbid all searches
conducted by government officials, only unreasonable ones. Traditional
analysis uses as a threshold question whether the search requires entry
into a "protected area."' 8 A search of a protected area normally requires
the issuance of a search warrant in order to become reasonable.' 9 In
certain situations-such as a search incident to a valid arrest 20 or con-
sent by the suspect 2' or a third party22---a warrantless search of a
protected area may be reasonable.23
15 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or thirtgs to be seized." U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV.
18 The sanction of the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence obtained in an unreasonable
search is not admissible in court, established for federal courts in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'7 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). But where the third party is acting at
the suggestion or direction of the police, the proscription of the amendment does apply.
See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Machlan v. State, 248 Ind.
218, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967); State v. Scrotsky, 39 NJ. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963). See also
Comment, Private Party Searches and Seizures-A Province of the Fifth Amendment,
3 U. SAN FRAN. L. Rxv. 159 (1968); Comment, The Applicability of the "New" Fourth
Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging
Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WAsn. L. Rv. 785 (1970).
18 The term "protected area" appears only in recent cases. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139 (1962). Nevertheless, it provides a convenient short form of expressing con-
cepts implicit in earlier fourth amendment case law. For a general discussion of property
concepts in fourth amendment analysis, see Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme
Court's Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 1 (1971).
19 Failure to obtain a warrant when one is necessary renders all evidence produced
from the search inadmissible at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Violation of the fourth amendment's protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures by government agents may also give rise to a cause of
action for damages against the agents. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947). Where the arrest is merely a pretext to conduct a search, the search
may be unconstitutional. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
21 See cases cited note 7 supra.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866
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The courts traditionally relied heavily upon property concepts to
determine the scope of protected areas. Thus a business office, 24 a
hotel,25 a rooming house,26 and a taxicab 27 were constitutionally pro.
tected areas, but a jail visiting room28 and an open field29 were not.
Even the early fourth amendment cases, however, contain indications
that the Supreme Court recognized that possessory property rights were
not the sole appropriate way of defining that area from which a person
had a right to exclude government agents.
In Ex parte Jackson,3" for example, Justice Field held that a warrant
is required before postal inspectors can "invade the secrecy of letters
and such sealed packages in the mail."31 And in Boyd v. United States,
3 2
the Court dealt with a subpoena of personal papers as both a violation
of the fifth amendment and a violation of the fourth amendment, with
little distinction made between the two types of protection.
Gradually it has become clearer that the fourth amendment right to
prevent governmental intrusions is a personal right of individuals
rather than a right attaching to property and exercisable only by those
with certain rights in that property. In Olmstead v. United States,
33
(1972); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); Commonwealth v. Biebig-
hauser, 450 Pa. 336, 300 A.2d 70 (1973).
23 The Supreme Court has held that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to
be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). In addition to the search incident to a valid arrest
and consent exceptions, the Court has held that where police are in "hot pursuit" of a
suspect, they need not delay their investigation to obtain a search warrant if to do so
would gravely endanger their own or others' lives. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
A warrantless search of an automobile or other vehicle may be conducted where it is not
practical to obtain a search warrant because the vehicle may be moved quickly. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Two
other exceptions to the search warrant requirement do not share the emergency nature
of the above situations. First, police may seize an object without a search warrant if it is
seen, "in plain view," from a place where the police have a lawful right to be. Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1967). Second, where property has been abandoned police may
search the property without a warrant. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). A
determination of abandonment rests on consideration of the factual circumstances of
the defendant's alleged act of abandonment and his intent in carrying out such actions.
24 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
25 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
26 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
27 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
28 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
29 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
30 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
3 Id. at 733.
32 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
33 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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Justice Brandeis argued, in dissent, for less reference to property inter-
ests in determining the reasonableness of a government search. 4 In
Jones v. United States,5 5 the Court moved in the direction suggested by
Justice Brandeis and rejected the procedural rule requiring that stand-
ing to object to a search be premised on ownership or possession of the
property searched. 6 The subtle distinctions of property law were
deemed inappropriate for determining what interests are protected
against governmental intrusions.37 Likewise, in Warden v. Hayden,38
the Court stated: "We have recognized that the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property,
and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers
rested on property concepts." 39
In Katz v. United States,40 the Court ruled inadmissible evidence
that FBI agents had obtained by attaching an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth. The
crucial question, the Court said, was not whether the governmental
action constituted a physical invasion of a physically defined "protected
area," but rather whether the governmental action constituted an
intrusion against which the individual had properly sought protection.
Thus, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,"
whereas "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 41 The Court seemed
to suggest that the protections of the fourth amendment were no longer
to be dependent upon the locus of the search or the property rights a
34 "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." 277 U.S. at 478. See also Brandeis & Warren, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HAuv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
35 862 U.S. 257 (1960).
36 The particular difficulty attacked was the situation where a defendant charged with
a possessory crime had to admit possession in order to gain standing to challenge the
search.
37 The test formulated in Jones was that anyone "legitimately on the premises," could
challenge the legality of the search, 362 U.S. at 267, which itself creates difficulties of
definition. See LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . .
Run Smooth," 1966 ILL. L.F. 255; Symposium-Constitutional Problems in the Adminis-
tration of Criminal Law, 59 Nw. U.. REv. 610 (1964). Nevertheless, the shift away from
tying fourth amendment protections to ownership-type property rights was clear.
38 887 U.S. 294 (1967).
59 Id. at 804. The Court rejected the distinction between evidentiary articles, which
could not be seized, and instrumentalities of the crime, which could.
40 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
41 Id. at 351-52.
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person has in the area physically invaded. The majority opinion in
Katz failed to give any criteria by which lower courts could define the
scope of the protections. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
Harlan suggested that a two-step requirement for fourth amendment
protection had emerged-that the defendant have actually exhibited an
expectation of privacy, and that such expectation be reasonable.
42
Katz might have been read as the final blow to a property-based
fourth amendment analysis. Property concepts, however, have not been
completely discarded in determining the reasonableness of a warrant-
less search, first because the courts are properly reluctant to disturb
long-standing definitions of the basic protections, and second because
the nature of the property searched for and the area in which the search
is conducted are relevant to the existence and reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy.43 This post-Katz approach has been labeled by
several commentators as "propertied privacy."
44
Although Harlan spoke in Katz of an actual as well as a reasonable
expectation of privacy,45 the "reasonable expectation" standard has not
in fact been made dependent upon the subjective expectations of the
defendant.4 6 In practice, the effect of the privacy approach has been
to extend the protections of the fourth amendment without affecting
the previous property-linked protections.47 It might be possible to
42 389 U.S. at 360. For a discussion of the way in which "reasonable" should be de-
fined, see text and note at note 46 infra.
43 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); People v. Dumas, - Cal. 3d -, 512
P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1973); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106
Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973); State v. Matias, 51 Haw. 62, 451 P.2d 257 (1969); People v. Nunn,
7 111. App. d 601, 288 N.E.2d 88 (1972).
44 See Kitch, supra note 1; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz
Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 1.
45 389 U.S. at 360.
46 The opinion in Katz supports this observation. In Katz the defendant quite obviously
expected surveillance, yet he was held to have an expectation of privacy. Similarly, a
defendant might, with subjective reasonableness, expect that the other party to a con-
versation will not relate the conversation to the police. Nevertheless, the Court has held
that there can be no reasonable expectation that the other party to a conversation will
not reveal it when asked. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In regard to
this latter example, it should be noted that the framework proposed in this comment
would not preclude persons from describing, in response to police questioning, things that
they have seen or heard. The framework proposed here is restricted to physical searches.
Thus although a brother, for example, could not consent to a police-initiated search for
narcotics, he could answer police inquiries about what he has seen or heard and testify in
a warrant hearing or a trial.
47 The one possible exception is Warden v. Hayden, 887 U.S. 294 (1967), where the
Court overturned the property-based distinction between evidentiary objects, which
could not be seized, and instrumentalities of the crime, traditionally held subject to
seizure on the ground that the state had a superior property interest. The Court stated
1973]
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unify the approaches by creating a presumption that every person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy within traditionally protected
areas. For the purposes of this comment, however, it is sufficient to
view the privacy approach as an indication of the Court's belief that in
certain circumstances a person should be accorded greater control over
his privacy unit than was previously accorded under property-linked
fourth amendment analysis.
II. TRADITIONAL JUsTIFICATIONS FoR THIRD-PARTY CONSENTS
The procedural safeguards surrounding the consent exception to the
search warrant requirement have received a great deal of attention. 8
A consent to a police request to search, whether given by the suspect
or a third party, must be clear, knowing, and uncoerced.4 9 Mere acqui-
escence in a police officer's asserted authority is not a valid consent.50
The Court has recently determined, however, that there need be no
specific warning of the right to refuse a request to search.51 Allowing
a third party's consent to validate an otherwise unreasonable search
has traditionally been justified by reference to property and agency
concepts. These concepts, however, have not been consistently applied,
and the case law on the subject is in considerable disarray.52
The ability of a third party to consent to a search has generally been
justified on one of two bases: the third party's possessory or control
interests in the searched area,53 or an agency relationship between the
that under the privacy approach the property-based distinction had become meaningless
and held that both types of material could be seized.
48 See, e.g., Lalave, supra note 37; LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme
Court: Further Ventures into the "Quagmire," 8 CRim. L. BuLL. 9 (1972); Note, Consent
Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLuar. L. REv. 130 (1967).
49 The concept of "dear, knowing and uncoerced" is, however, open to much abuse.
In State v. Rye, 2 Wash. App. 920, 471 P.2d 96 (1970), for example, the police were
originally told by the wife of the defendant that she would not consent. Only after they
told her that they would go get a search warrant did she say, "If you think there is
anything in this house that is stolen ...you go ahead and find it. I am not going to
help you." 471 P.2d at 98. The court held this to be a dear, knowing, and uncoerced
consent.
50 In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), police falsely announced that
they had a search warrant. The grandmother's consent was held invalid because it was
mere acquiescence in a claim of lawful authority. In Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921), the Court held that where officers announced to the wife that they had come to
search the premises for violations of the revenue law, there was implied coercion.
51 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
52 See, e.g., cases cited at notes 53-55 and 62 infra. See also cases gathered in LaFave,
supra note 37, at 312-22.
53 Several jurisdictions have used this basis to hold, for example, that spouses may
consent to a search. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970); People v.
Haskell, 41 Ill. 2d 25, 241 N.E.2d 430 (1969); Commonwealth v. Biebighauser, 450 Pa.
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consenting third party and the defendant.54 Often both justifications
are invoked in a single case.55
In Chapman v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court dealt with both
of these justifications while invalidating a search of a lessee's apartment
conducted pursuant to the landlord's consent. The Court held that the
landlord's limited possessory rights did not validate the third-party
consent, and that although the landlord was expressly authorized in
the lease to enter the apartment to view waste, his authority did not
extend to allowing police to enter to search for incriminating evi-
dence.57
Similar reasons underlay the Court's decision in Stoner v. Califor-
nia,5 8 where a search of the defendant's hotel room, consented to by the
night hotel clerk, was held invalid. The Court flatly rejected the prose-
cution's claim that the police had reasonable basis to believe that the
clerk had authority to consent. In a much quoted paragraph the Court
said:
336, 300 A.2d 70 (1973); Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 ('rex. Grim. App.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 934 (1969). Some jurisdictions have held to the contrary that a spouse cannot con-
sent to a search of the other spouse's property. E.g., State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167
(1963); Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951). Parents have been held to
be able to consent. E.g., United States v. De Prima, 472 F.2d 550 (lst Cir. 1973); Maxwell
v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964); McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320
(1964). Siblings can also consent, e.g., Shorey v. Warden, 401 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 915 (1968); People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966), as can roommates,
e.g., People v. Banks, 238 Cal. 2d 43, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
In several jurisdictions the scope of search under the possession and control rule is
limited to areas held in common. Objects in the exclusive control of the searched party,
such as personal effects or locked boxes, may not be searched even with the consent of a
third party with equal or superior possessory or property rights in the premises. See
Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 372
P.2d 365 (1962).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Ennox v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 328, 94 S.W.2d
473 (1936).
55 See, e.g., People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Misquez,
152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 313 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1957).
56 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
57 The possessory concepts used in Chapman are somewhat perplexing in that the
property law discussion refers to Georgia law. The Court, however, did not dearly hold
that state law controls the ability of a landlord to consent to a search of the leased
premises. Similarly, in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1963) (discussed in text and
note at note 59 infra), the Court noted that even if it were assumed that California law
could authorize the clerk to consent, there was no indication that California law so
provided. The Court's avoidance of the question of which law controls might be taken
as an indication that protection against governmental intrusion is a right appertaining to
the person and governed by the Constitution, rather than to the property under state law.
58 376 U.S. 483 (1963).
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[The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be
eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unreal-
istic doctrines of "apparent authority." . .. It was a right, there-
fore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either
directly or through an agent.59
In keeping with the Supreme Court decisions in Stoner and Chap-
man, lower courts have generally held that persons with rights of
possession inferior to those of the defendant cannot consent to a police
search of the defendant's premises or effects. Employees 3 and employ-
ers,"1 for example, have seldom been allowed to consent to the search
of the other's property. The courts have not been consistent, however,
in their determination of whether bailees possess the control necessary
for a valid third-party consent to a police search.6 2
Although a private individual with possessory rights inferior to those
of the defendant does not violate the Constitution by giving incrimi-
nating evidence to the police as the fruits of a private search,6 3 he can-
not legitimately consent to a police request to search. He is also pro-
hibited from conducting the search at the initiation of the police; in
that case his actions are considered to be governmental actions and the
search must meet the warrant requirements.64
The traditional property-oriented justifications for third-party con-
sents have not escaped criticism.6 5 The doctrine of implied agency has
9 Id. at 488-89. Stoner has been read by some commentators as indicating that only
third-party consents given by those with express authority to permit such searches are
permissible. See Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: Need for a New Evalua-
tion, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. RaV. 82 (1966); Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure,
33 U. CM. L. R V. 797 (1966). See also United States v. Greer, 297 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D.
Miss. 1960) where the court held that a wife cannot waive her husband's constitutional
rights under the fourth amendment unless he has expressly authorized her to do so.
60 E.g., People v. Smith, 43 Mich. App. 400, 204 N.W.2d 308 (1972).
61 E.g., United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (official superior in govern-
ment office consented to search of employee's desk).
62 In United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962), the court held that where
the defendant loaned his car to a party who later consented to a police search, the
delegation of authority was sufficient to imply an agency relationship. But see State v.
Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
63 See cases cited note 80 infra; United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969). The court in Blok held that
it was permissible for the employer to give the police evidence that he discovered while
looking for office papers or supplies in employee's desk, but he could not consent to a
police search of the desk. In Small, the court stated that although the locker inspector
had the right to view the locker's contents, he could not consent to a search of the
defendant's locker by law enforcement officials.
64 In searches conducted by a private individual, government involvement at any stage
of the search is sufficient to bring the exclusionary rule into play. Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74 (1949); cf. United States v. Ogden, 484 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1973).
65 See Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search and Seizure of the Hus-
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seemed particularly vulnerable to criticism as a fiction designed to
allow police to conduct what would otherwise be an unreasonable
search and seizure. In consent searches agency must almost always be
inferred, and this inference must be made from facts that in other cir-
cumstances would not support a finding of implied agency.66
The conceptual framework underlying the possession and control
justification is less vulnerable to the charge of convenient fictionalism.
Possession and control of the premises normally does carry with it
the recognized right to admit social visitors, salesmen, and even police.
The issue, however, is whether one person's equal or even superior
possessory rights should be allowed to override another's possessory
plus privacy interest. Although each occupant has both possessory and
privacy interests in the premises, police generally inform occupants
of their identity and their purpose, T thus revealing whose privacy
interest they seek to invade.
A corollary of the possession and control justification is the "assump-
tion of risk" doctrine. Under this concept it is argued that by trusting
a spouse or cotenant with access to one's privacy unit, one assumes the
risk of that person consenting to a police request to search. 68 By con-
ventional social standards, however, the assumption of risk should be
greater where strangers or others with inferior possessory rights have
been given access to the privacy unit than where spouses or cotenants
have been given access. Yet although the "risk" is assumed as to those
close to the defendant, the defendant is not considered to have assumed
any risk as to, for example, garbagemen consenting to a search. 69 The
band's Property, 69 DIcK. L. Rxv. 69 (1964); Comment, Third Party Consent to Search
and Seizure: A Reexamination, 20 J. PuB. L. 313 (1971); Comment, Third Party Consent to
Search and Seizure, supra note 59; Note, Third Party Consent to Police Searches, 2 U. SAN
FRAN. L. RPv. 141 (1967).
66 For example, an agency relationship will generally not be inferred unless the agent
has performed similar acts in the past. For an extended discussion of the inapplicability
of agency concepts to the third party consent situation, see Comment, Third Party Con-
sent to Search and Seizure, supra note 59; Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After
Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 48, at 149. See also the discussion in Kelley v. State, 184
Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946), which suggests that police must determine whether the
wife has the best interests of her husband in mind when she consents. Otherwise, the
court held, she would have no right to waive his fourth amendment protections. Requir-
ing such a determination would place an impossible burden on the police.
In cases where the consenting party is the express agent of the defendant, however,
and the agent's explicit authority to consent to a police search extends to the searched
items, consent would also be valid under the framework proposed in this comment. See,
e.g., In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947); United
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
67 See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970).
68 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
69 People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971). Although the
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inconsistencies in the assumption of risk justification and the fact that
spouses or cotenants are often likely to be unaware that they can
refuse to consent make the assumption of risk justification an unsatis-
factory framework.
In light of the inadequacies, of these traditional justifications for
permitting third-party consents and the trend away from exclusive
reliance on property concepts in defining the scope of the fourth
amendment, a re-evaluation of the rules governing third-party consent
is appropriate.
III. PROPERTIED PRIVACY AND THmRD-PARTY CONSENTS
In the few cases where federal and state courts have actually con-
sidered the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy in deter-
mining whether evidence obtained with the consent of a third party
should be admitted, they have consistently found the consent invalid;
70
but they have neglected fully to articulate the two-step test outlined in
Katz. Their findings of invalidity have been premised solely on a deter-
mination that the defendant's expectations of privacy were invaded.
Privacy has been conceptualized as "the legally recognized freedom
or power of an individual . . . to determine the extent to which an-
other individual ... may... obtain or reveal information about him
or those for whom he is personally responsible .... "71 For the purposes
of establishing a framework for third-party consents, the essential ele-
ment in this concept is that an individual's "privacy unit" defines not
only where he is protected, but also who can permit entry into his pri-
vacy unit. Thus Katz had a reasonable expectation that the words he
spoke in the phone booth were private except as to the acknowledged
listener, but no expectation that the listener would not relay those
words to the police. Similarly, one can reasonably expect that the person
with whom one shares a home may testify as to what he sees or volun-
tarily give material to the police, but will not acquiesce in a police re-
quest to enter the privacy unit.7 2
court does not mention the term "assumption of risk," the decision implies that one
may expect garbagemen to protect a privacy interest.
70 State v. Matais, 51 Haw. 62, 451 P.2d 257 (1969) (friend of defendant consented to
a search of defendant's coat while it was in friend's apartment); People v. Smith, 19
Mich. App. 359, 172 N.W.2d 902 (1969) (younger brother of defendant consented to a
search of their apartment); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (man-
ager of store consented to police surveillance of restroom stalls); State v. Taggart, 491
P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. Ore. 1971) (landlady consented to search of apartment where tenancy
had terminated without tenant's knowledge).
71 Beaney, supra note 3, at 254. See also Douse, supra note 2; Fried, supra note 2.
72 As has been noted above, these definitions of privacy expectations depend to a
great extent on the norms that the Supreme Court chooses to establish. It is suggested,
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It is suggested that where an area is protected as to the defendant,
and the third party has at least equal possession and control rights but
no interest in consenting to a police search, the defendant has a rea-
sonable expectation that the third party will not consent to a search.3
Nevertheless, there are situations in which the third party has, in
addition to the requisite possessory rights, an interest in consenting
sufficient to render the defendant's expectations of privacy unreason-
able. Such a countervailing interest arises, for example, where the con-
senting third party is threatened by the defendant's suspected criminal
activity.
In structuring a framework for defining reasonable expectation of
privacy as related to third-party consents, it is important to consider
that when police request consent to search they cannot be expected
to engage in complex evaluations to determine, on the doorstep,
whether the consenting party actually has a countervailing interest
sufficient to validate the consent. Courts have long taken the position
that search and seizure procedures must be easy to administer.7 4 Thus
the definition of countervailing interest sufficient to render an expec-
tation of privacy unreasonable must be framed so as to allow easy,
practical determination. One means of accomplishing this is by the
creation of a presumption of a sufficient countervailing interest where
the consenting third party actually initiates75 the police activity that
leads to the search.7 6 On the other hand, when police initiate the
search there must be a presumption that the consenting third party
has no countervailing interest sufficient to override the defendant's
expectations of privacy.7 7 Except in a few clearly defined circumstances,
however, that the norms proposed in this comment provide a reasonable compromise be-
tween the individual's interest in maintaining a privacy unit and society's interest in effec-
tive law enforcement.
73 It is impossible to prove by legal analysis that this expectation exists or should be
recognized. Nevertheless, common sense indicates that this is the minimum that one
should be recognized as properly expecting from someone who shares one's privacy unit.
For an interesting discussion of the function of the privacy unit, see Fried, supra note 2.
74 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973).
75 For a discussion of the concept of initiation and the purposes it serves, see text and
notes at notes 91-95 infra.
76 Although the presumption of a countervailing interest which is triggered by the
third party's" initiation of police action need not be irrebuttable, it must be strong if it is
to serve its purpose of permitting the police to rely on it in determining whether a sub-
sequent consent will validate a search.
77 Here also the presumption should be a strong one, in this case to protect against
police abuse of consent searches. If, for example, a strong request following a police
statement of suspicion were allowed to rebut the presumption, the police would be en-
couraged to exaggerate their stories in order to frighten the third party, and in general
the test would be difficult for the courts to administer with any consistency.
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a third-party consent would not justify a police-initiated warrantless
search.7s
Developing the model of propertied privacy with reference to recent
third-party consent cases provides a focus for examining the changes
this analysis would produce in the existing case law. It also indicates
what types of countervailing interests should render a defendant's
expectations of privacy unreasonable and reveals several of the prob-
lems encountered in administering the proposed changes in third-party
consent analysis.
IV. TIm PROPERTIED PRIVACY MODEL
Recent third-party consent cases may be analyzed according to who
initiated the search and who conducted it, resulting in a tripartite
classification. First, a number of cases dealt with under the rubric of
third-party consents can more realistically be characterized as searches
initiated by a third party with no police participation. These searches
are private and thus not within the purview of the fourth amendment.
Second, searches initiated by the third party but involving some degree
of police participation are properly considered as quasi-police searches
subject to the restrictions of the fourth amendment, and should be
analyzed under the presumption of countervailing interest framework
discussed above. Finally, police-initiated searches should be presumed
not to be justified by a countervailing interest of the third party. It is
suggested that this presumption be rebutted only where: the third
party is either a suspected participant in or a possible victim of the
suspected criminal activity;79 the property to be searched has been
abandoned; or suspicion has not yet "focused" on any individual.
A. Private Searches
In several recent cases reference to the validity of a third-party con-
sent to justify the warrantless seizure was unnecessary. In each case a
third party initiated the police contact and, when the police arrived,
either the evidence was merely handed over to them,8 0 or the third
78 For reasons of administrative convenience, the framework proposed here would re-
tain current doctrine of "apparent authority" under which the police are entitled to rely
on apparent sufficient possession and control. See, e.g., Mengarelli v. United States, 426 F.2d
985 (9th Cir. 1970). The police would be allowed to rely, for example, on a reasonable ap-
pearance that the third person is a victim of the defendant's suspected criminal activities,
see text and note at note 79 infra.
79 In these -cases the countervailing interest exists and is definable in a way that does
not require reference to the initiation of the police contact resulting in the search.




party spontaneously searched and turned over the incriminating evi-
dence.81
In Bernovich v. State,82 for example, the defendant's wife drove his
car to her father's home and informed her father of suspicious articles
she had noticed under the back seat. He examined the items, put them
back under the seat, and called the police. When the officers arrived
the father and daughter handed them the incriminating evidence. In
State v. Parton,88 a babysitter called the police, claiming that one of
the children she was guarding had been raped by the defendant, who
lived with the children's mother. When the police arrived, the mother
spontaneously gave them incriminating evidence that she had found
in the house. In State v. Cundy,8 the owner of a calf, accompanied by
a police officer, complied with the request of a ranch hand to view a
calf that the ranch hand suspected his boss was intending to brand as
his own. The court found that the search was private and that the
officer was merely an onlooker. In each of these cases the search was
not a governmental intrusion. Only the court in Cundy, however, cor-
rectly analyzed the situation as a private search.8 5
B. Quasi-Police Searches
Where a third party in possession and control of the premises sum-
mons the police and requests that they conduct a search, there is suffi-
cient government involvement to require that fourth amendment pro-
tections adhere.8 " In these circumstances a warrantless search by the
police will be reasonable under the propertied privacy analysis only
where defendant's expectations of privacy are unreasonable due to a
countervailing interest on the part of the consenting third party. The
most striking example of a countervailing interest that would render
the defendant's expectations of privacy unreasonable exists where the
defendant causes or threatens physical harm and the victim seeks police
81 State v. Cundy, 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972); Mears v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 435, 190 N.W.2d
184 (1971) (mother's private search revealed the stolen property which she displayed to
the police. She subsequently consented to its seizure.).
82 272 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
83 487 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1972).
84 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972).
85 Since Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), evidence obtained by a private
individual has been held admissible regardless of the lawful or unlawful nature of the
search. In that case incriminating papers were stolen from the defendant's safe and
turned over to federal prosecutors by agents of the company for which the defendant
worked. See also, e.g., People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (1957).
86 See, e.g., Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); United States v. Ogden, 484 F.2d
1274 (9th Cir. 1973).
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aid and involves them in a search. In these cases joint possession and
control indicates a proximity that compels immediate protective action
by the third party, and an expectation that an assaulted person will not
seek protection from the police is unreasonable.
In State v. Middaugh,s7 the defendant's wife sought police aid after
an assault on herself and her child by her husband, who was using
narcotics. Both she and police engaged in a search which revealed the
narcotics. The court held that the wife's consent validated the search
because she was in possession and control of the premises. Rather than
relying exclusively on the property rights of the third party, the court
should have reached its result by holding that the defendant could not
have had any reasonable expectation that an assaulted spouse would
preserve his privacy.88
Likewise, in United States v. Lawless89 a wife contacted police, claim-
ing that her husband had assaulted her. When officers came to arrest
the defendant, the wife initiated a search of their trailer home for a
shotgun. An officer accompanied her during the search but took no
active role. Looking at eye level into the trailer, however, the officer
observed the gun under the sofa. Both the wife and the officer retrieved
the weapon. As in Middaugh, the defendant could have no reasonable
expectations of privacy with regard to the victim of his assault.
In State v. Mizelle" the consenting party was not the actual target
of physical harm or threat, but defendant's expectations of privacy were
nonetheless rendered unreasonable. The defendant had incestuous
relations with his daughter. Upon discovering the crime the mother
87 507 P.2d 42 (Ore. Ct. App. 1973).
88 An additional problema introduced in Middaugh is the effect of the actual presence
of the defendant on a third party's ability to consent to a search. Under the traditional
justifications for third-party consent, the agency doctrine clearly should require that the
request be directed to the defendant, but under the possession and control rule the pres-
ence or availability of the defendant should make no difference in the ability of a third
party to consent. Few courts, however, have upheld a warrantless search consented to by
a third party when the defendant is present. In Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d
65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963), the court held a warrantless search unreason-
able where the consent of one tenant was objected to by the other tenant. The court stated
that mere sharing of legal possession was not sufficient to put one at the mercy of a co-
tenant.
Where the defendant has victimized the third party, as in Middaugh, the emergency
nature of the situation is such that the third-party consent should validate a warrantless
search despite defendant's objections. Where the third party merely suspects criminal
activity and has initiated a police search, it is unlikely that the defendant will be present.
If the defendant is present, the existence of exigent circumstances, such as the possible
destruction of evidence should police leave without searching, should determine whether
the third-party consent overrides defendant's objections.
89 465 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1972).
90 15 N.C. App. 583, 190 S.E.2d 277 (1972).
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asked the sheriff to search for evidence on the property. Where a minor
child is involved, the defendant cannot reasonably expect that his
privacy will be protected by a third party who is charged with the care
of the child.91
In the victim-of-assault cases, the third party's interest that overrode
and rendered unreasonable the defendant's expectation of privacy was
the interest in being protected from a threat of physical harm. An
analogous situation occurs when the person in possession or control of
the premises suspects that the defendant is using the premises to engage
in criminal activity. The fact that the third party is in sufficient pos-
session and control to trigger the first half of the consent requirement
indicates that apprehension of the defendant by the police is likely to
involve the third party in criminal proceedings-perhaps as an acces-
sory and at least as a witness. The third party may have an interest in
avoiding these involvements. In addition, distaste for the criminal ac-
tivity or a desire to aid law enforcement may generate a strong coun-
tervailing interest. The difficult problem is in determining when the
interest is sufficient to render the defendant's expectation of privacy
unreasonable.
In the case of a desire to aid law enforcement, for example, a prob-
lem arises because any person, if asked in a court of law whether he or
she desires to aid law enforcement, is likely to answer affirmatively.
Nevertheless, it is likely that most people do not expect a person with
whom they have joint possession and control of a privacy unit to acqui-
esce in a police request to search for evidence against themselves. A test
is needed for determining when the countervailing interest is sufficiently
great to render the expectation of privacy unreasonable. An administra-
tively feasible standard for measuring the intensity of a third party's
interest in having the police search is whether the third party initiated
the police activity. Initiation should be defined as initiation of the con-
tact that results in the consent to search. Under this definition if the
police, for example, initiate contact with the suspect's wife and explain
their suspicions to her, and she then requests that they search, the
search is defined as police-initiated and is presumed 92 to be unreason-
able. This definition results in some limits on the police that could be
avoided by defining initiation as the first request to search. The initia-
tion of contact definition, however, is administratively simpler because
it does not require the courts to interpret fine shades of meaning in
91 This prindple might be extended to other members of the family unit so that, for
example, the son in a family where the father is threatening assault on the wife may con-
sent to a search.
92 For a discussion of the proper strength of this presumption, see note 77 supra.
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the third party's statements. Moreover, it allows the police to decide
at the moment of the search whether a consent will legitimize the
search. 93 The initiation criterion also removes from the police the
temptation to exaggerate their fears in the hope of inducing a request
to search that would not otherwise be forthcoming.
Validating all third-party consents would, of course, completely
solve the problem of administrability. Complete validation might be
defended on the ground that in many cases of police initiation the
third party nevertheless has a strong interest in aiding law enforce-
ment. In many other cases, however, the third party is likely to be
consenting without an awareness that he may refuse, without knowl-
edge of the defendant's activities, or because of a belief that failure
to consent would be an admission of the defendant's guilt. In evalu-
ating the likelihood that the third party's consent to a police-initiated
search is based on a strong commitment to aid law enforcement, it is
suggested that the court should err in favor of minimizing impulsive
and unknowing consents that serve no countervailing interest.
Where the third party does initiate the search there is no problem
of unawareness of a right to refuse, for it is clear that the third party
would not refuse a police request. There is also no possibility that the
third party lacks knowledge. of the defendant's activities, for it is
precisely those activities about which he has notified the police. Finally,
the fact of third-party initiation is clear evidence of the strength of
the third party's interest in having the police search.
Several cases involving searches initiated by a third party in response
to an assault or a threat were discussed above.94 Recent third-party
cases also provide several examples of nonvictim initiation. In United
States v. Hughes,95 a woman initiated a police search of her home
because she wished to put a stop to her lover's illegal counterfeiting
activities, which were taking place at her residence. In Stein v. United
States,96 the wife contacted police officers and requested their aid in
disposing of narcotics used by her husband. In both cases the evi-
dence was held admissible on the ground that consent had been ob-
tained from a person in possession and control of the premises. The
facts would also have supported a finding that the third party's ini-
tiation of the police-contact indicated the existence of an interest on
98 A more complicated and administratively difficult test, combined with the heavy
penalty for mistakes inflicted by the exclusionary rule, might force police to seek a warrant
in every case rather than risk an error in evaluating the validity of the consent.
94 See text and notes at notes 87-91 supra.
95 441 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1971).
96 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S. 884 (1948).
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the part of the third party sufficient to render any expectations of
privacy by the defendant unreasonable.
In State v. Fassler97 a common carrier had reason to believe that the
defendant's trunks contained contraband. The carrier had a statutory
right to inspect items in its possession when such a suspicion existed,
but asked police to search instead. The court upheld the validity of
the search through traditional third-party consent analysis. Under the
propertied privacy model, the same conclusion would be reached. The
defendant's privacy expectations were rendered unreasonable by the
third party's countervailing interest. The third party suspected that its
premises were being used to ship contraband and desired police aid to
rid itself of the fruits of criminal activity.
In an earlier case with a similar fact situation, the court employed
a framework similar to the one suggested in this comment. In Corn-
gold v. United States,98 airline employees had the same statutory right
as the carrier in Fassler to inspect packages suspected of containing
contraband. Government customs agents asked them to exercise that
right of search. The court held that the airline employees were acting
as police agents and therefore the search was government-initiated.
The evidence was thus inadmissible since no search warrant had been
obtained. The crucial point was that, left to themselves, the airline
employees would not have searched.99 The court, however, did not
deal with the problem in terms of expectations of privacy or the
countervailing interests of the consenting party.
A search initiated by a third party will generally be either a private
search or a quasi-police search. Some difficulty arises in determining
what degree of police involvement will require one classification or
the other. 00 The problem, however, is only of theoretical interest,
because the presumption of countervailing interest created by third-
97 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972).
98 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
99 corngold provides an example of a situation where the police action did not coerce
the consent, but nevertheless was the sole cause of the invasion of the defendant's privacy.
It is in preventing abuses by the police in this ambiguous area that the initiation standard
is most useful.
100 Police presence at the doorstep or passive presence in the house, prompted by the
request of a third party in possession and control, does not violate the normal concept of
a private search. See State v. Cundy, 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972). Police direction of the
search or physical participation of any kind, however, puts the search into the quasi-
police category. See, e.g., Machlan v. State, 248 Ind. 218, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967). Yet if a
private individual is conducting an unlawful search in police presence, mere passivity
of police will not preclude the court from finding that the individual acted as a police
agent. See, e.g., Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960).
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party initiation renders quasi-police searches-as well as private
searches-reasonable.
C. Police-Initiated Searches
When police initiate a search, it cannot be presumed that a con-
senting third party has a countervailing interest sufficient to render
the defendant's privacy expectations unreasonable. To ensure the pro-
tection of fourth amendment rights and for reasons of administrative
simplicity, there should instead be a presumption that no counter-
vailing interest exists, and, with a few exceptions, a third-party consent
should not be held to make an otherwise unreasonable search rea-
sonable.101
There are at least four situations, however, where despite the police
initiation of the search, third-party consent should be allowed to legiti-
mize the search. First, where the third party in possession and control
of the premises has been victimized by the defendant's conduct, 02 the
defendant can have no reasonable expectation that the victim will
preserve his privacy against government intrusion. In this case, there-
fore, the victim's consent to a police-initiated request to search should
legitimize the search.
Second, where the consenting party has possession and control and
is an apparent coparticipant in the criminal activities, 0 3 his consent
to the search should suffice. One might have a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to partners in crime before suspicion focuses,
because revelation of evidence incriminating one partner would
usually be damaging to the other; once suspicion has focused, however,
each partner must reasonably expect that the other, in seeking to co-
operate with police for his own benefit, may consent to a search reveal-
ing evidence incriminating as to both. 04
101 See text and note at note 77 supra.
102 See, e.g., Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192 (ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951
(1973); Villene v. United States, 297 A.2d 785 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Mizelle, 15 N.C.
App. 583, 190 S.E.2d 277 (1972); State v. Middaugh, 507 P.2d 42 (Ore. Ct. App. 1978).
103 See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), discussed in text at note 105 infra;
United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866 (1972), where a co-
conspirator, wishing to remove suspicion from herself by fully cooperating with the
police, allowed police to search her apartment for items belonging to the defendant.
104 The coparticipant exception to the general presumption against police-initiated
searches may be highly prone to abuse. The police in many situations will be able to
assert, with some credibility, that although their main interest was in the def6ndant, they
also suspected his cotenant or spouse of participation in the crime. One means of pro-
tecting against this abuse is close scrutiny by the courts to determine whether the "sus-
picion of the third party" was in fact a pretext; such a procedure, however, might be
difficult for the courts to apply effectively.
[41:121
Third-Party Consent Searches
In Frazier v. Cupp,1 5 the Supreme Court validated a search based
on a coparticipant's consent, but did not adopt the propertied privacy
analysis formulated above. Rather the Court introduced the concept
of assumption of risk into the third-party consent area. Unfortunately
"assumption of risk" also reaches cases such as spousal or cotenant
consent, where it cannot be made consistent with any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.10 6 The assumption of risk formulation of copar-
ticipant's consents, however, may be seen as merely another way of
saying that the defendant's expectations of privacy are unreasonable,
insofar as a coparticipant's interest in cooperating to protect himself
once suspicion has focused eliminates any reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Third, where police have determined that property has been aban-
doned by the defendant, they may conduct a warrantless search of the
premises with the consent of a third party in possession and control.1
07
The very meaning of abandonment is that the defendant no longer has
any reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the property'
08
Finally, an individual's privacy rights may in rare circumstances be
subordinated to important state interests in effective law enforcement
-even where no countervailing interest of a third party has rendered
the defendant's expectation of privacy unreasonable. If the police are
conducting a general investigatory search where suspicion has not yet
focused, to require either a search warrant for all premises to be
searched or the consent of all occupants of all premises would seriously
undermine the ability of the police to conduct general investigations.
Thus a general investigatory search might be justified by third-party
consent.
105 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 450 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1971) and United States
v. Cataldo, 433 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1970), where lower courts
adopted the assumption of risk framework in cotenant situations.
107 The determination of whether property has been abandoned involves consideration
of both the actions and the intent of the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson,
472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Roberts, 465 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1972); People
v. Carr, 8 Cal. 3d 287, 502 P.2d 513, 104 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1972).
108 Where the fact of abandonment is premised on defendant's denial of ownership,
thus allowing police to conduct a warrantless search, courts have recognized that those
individuals accused of possessory crimes are faced with a dilemma. See, e.g., United States
v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973). In order to challenge the legality of a search, a de-
fendant must establish that he is the victim of an invasion of privacy. Thus to acquire
standing to protest, one must claim ownership or possession of the searched object, which
in possessory crimes amounts to an admission of guilt. To solve this dilemma the Court
has held that, at least with regard to possessory crimes, a defendant may have standing
to object without alleging possession. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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In West v. State,10 9 police were looking for a stolen calf. They in-
quired at all the farms in the vicinity of the theft, and there was no
evidence that suspicion had focused on the defendant any more clearly
than any other individual in the entire county. Defendant's mother
consented to a search which resulted in the discovery of the stolen calf.
The court admitted the evidence of the search on the ground that the
mother was in possession and control of the premises and thus could
consent to a search, but the consent could as easily be held valid on
unfocused suspicion grounds.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the general investigation
exception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 1° Coolidge is often cited
for the proposition that a wife may consent to a search of premises
she shares with her husband, but the Court did not in fact reach that
issue. Police were conducting a general investigatory search of the
neighborhood in which a murder had taken place. At each house they
inquired about weapons and the occupant's whereabouts on the night
of the crime. Coolidge had already shown his weapons to one set of
policemen. The next day, when he was not present, another set of
police-unaware of those who had visited earlier and unaware that
suspicion was beginning to focus on Coolidge"'--questioned his wife
about her husband's guns and what he had been wearing on the night
of the murder. Although the police did not request a search, Mrs.
Coolidge retrieved the guns and clothes and asked the police if they
wanted to take the articles with them. The Court recognized that there
was no search and inferred from police behavior that no search was
even intended. Under the model proposed here, the result in Coolidge
was correct and would have been so even if the police had sought the
wife's consent to search, because at that time suspicion had not focused
on any individual.
There are administrative problems in determining when suspicion
has properly focused so as to require police to either obtain a search
warrant or the defendant's consent. The Court, however, has not found
itself unable to deal with the analogous problem of determining when
"Miranda warnings" must be given.
112
It is suggested that when police are merely engaged in the general
fact-finding procedure, suspicion has not properly focused. Where they
109 503 P.2d 221 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
210 403 U.S. 443 (1970).
111 It might be argued that where suspicion had focused, as it had on Coolidge, the
Court should hold all policemen to constructive notice of that focusing. The Court, how-
ever, did not take that position in this case.
112 See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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suspect, however, that a given individual has engaged in criminal ac-
tivity, either due to information obtained from an informant, the
individual's past criminal record, or the trail of circumstantial evi-
dence, then suspicion has focused, and the use of third-party consents
must be modified as suggested in this comment.
D. Unreasonable Searches
The examples discussed above are cases where the consent would
have made the search reasonable even under the proposed framework.
It is also useful, however, to examine recent cases in which the proposed
framework would have invalidated the consent search.
In Commonwealth v. Biebighauser,18 for example, the defendant
was in custody on a murder charge, and the police, rather than asking
the defendant for permission to search his house, went to the house
and obtained consent from his wife to search areas that she shared with
the defendant. The court held that this consent search was constitu-
tional. Under the proposed framework, however, the police would
have been required to either ask for consent from the defendant or
obtain a warrant. In McGee v. State,"- the defendant lived "as a
member of the family""15 with Mr. and Mrs. Farrar, to whom he was
not related. At the request of police officers, Mrs. Farrar consented to
a search of defendant's room. The court held that Mrs. Farrar had
equal rights with the defendant to the use or occupation of the prem-
ises, and that she could therefore consent to a search. Under the pro-
posed framework, this consent would not have legitimized the search.
CONCLUSION
The movement in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions
from an emphasis on property concepts to a consideration of both
property concepts and reasonable expectations of privacy requires that
the third-party consent exception to the rule against warrantless
searches be re-examined. The dominance of property concepts in ju-
dicial analysis of this subject has fostered inconsistent decisions and
complex police guidelines that do not satisfy the courts' own insistence
on administrative convenience. 16
113 450 Pa. 36, 300 A.2d 70 (1978).
114 451 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970).
115 451 S.W.2d at 712.
116 The question of who has apparent authority to consent to a police-initiated
search has remained a disturbing problem to police officers and courts despite the Stoner
and Chapman decisions. For example, in People v. Miller, 40 III. 2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407
(1968), the defendant was an employee in the private home of an invalid. Police asked
and received from the owner of the home permission to search the car in the garage. The
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When privacy is conceptualized as control over the privacy unit, thus
incorporating the questions of where one might reasonably expect pri-
vacy and whom one might reasonably expect to preserve it, the tradi-
tional possession and control test is inadequate. Even those persons
who have the requisite possession and control interests (usually the
defendant's cotenants or members of his family) should not be allowed
to consent to a warrantless search of the premises they share with the
defendant unless they have a countervailing interest that renders the
defendant's expectations of privacy unreasonable.
Examination of recent case law suggests that guidelines can be estab-
lished to determine when the defendant's expectations of privacy are
unreasonable. When a third party in possession or control of the
property to be searched initiates the search, there should be a strong
presumption that the party has a countervailing interest sufficient to
render the defendant's expectations of privacy unreasonable. Usually
the third party's interest is in avoiding use of his privacy unit for
criminal activities, or in seeking the aid of the police as the victim of
the suspected criminal activity. Where police initiate the search, either
on information gained from their informants or from their own in-
vestigations, it should be presumed that a third party does not have a
countervailing interest sufficient to allow the substitution of his con-
sent for a search warrant. Although several circumstances justifying
police-initiated third-party consent searches have been suggested, any
exception to the presumption against police-initiated searches must be
narrowly construed by the courts if fourth amendment guarantees
against unreasonable government intrusion are to be maintained.
In its recent decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,117 the Supreme
Court held that procedural warnings advising the subject of a search
of his right to refuse consent are not necessary. The ignorant or in-
advertent consent to a police search permitted by the Court's decision
in Schneckloth is particularly troublesome when made by a third party,
court held that the owner's apparent authority to consent, relied on in good faith by the
officers, was not sufficient to waive effectively the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
The model presented in this comment does not succeed in eliminating all possible prob-
lems, but the general limitation of third-party consents to those individuals who initiate a
search should result in fewer circumstances where police will be in doubt as to the ability
of a third party to consent. An additional problem with current analysis is the difficulty of
determining when coercion, which invalidates the consent, exists. See Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). By generally allowing third-party consents only when the
third party initiates the search, inquiries into the voluntariness of the consent, the state of
mind of the consenting party, and the effect of the officers' words and actions should be an
easier task.
117 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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who is likely to have even less grasp of the consequences of his action
than a suspect. The proposed propertied privacy analysis would bring
consistency into third-party consent doctrine, thereby simplifying the
court's disposition of these cases, increasing the convenience of search
and seizure guidelines, and significantly reducing the likelihood of
third-party consents resulting from an ignorant acquiescence in a
police-initiated search.
Virginia Lee Cook
